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INTRODUCTION
In June 1972, Chile’s democratically elected leader, Salvador
Allende, hired the British cyberneticist, Stafford Beer, to bring
Chile into the computer age.1 Beer proposed “Project Cyberfolk,”
a cybernetic system that would further popular participation and
democracy by allowing citizens to communicate their feelings directly to the government.2 Beer built a device that would allow citizens to adjust a pointer on a voltmeter-like dial in order to indicate
moods ranging from extreme unhappiness to complete bliss.3 The
1

Evgeny Morozov, The Planning Machine Project Cybersyn and the Origins of the Big
Data Nation, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/10/13/planning-machine.
2
“Project Cyberfolk consisted of a relatively simple technological system that would
function within a complex social system with the aim of improving its management ….
Beer proposed building several [algedonic] meters and using them to conduct
experiments on how technology could further popular participation and democracy.” See
EDEN MEDINA, CYBERNETIC REVOLUTIONARIES: TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN
ALLENDE’S CHILE 81–92 (2011).
3
Morozov, supra note 1.
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device would record a citizen’s happiness—ideally during a live
television broadcast featuring some proposed new political policy—and electronically send the data directly to the government for
real-time aggregation and review.4 Beer theorized that his system
would improve public well-being and bring homeostatic stability
between government and constituent.5
Beer’s dream would not be realized.6 However, despite his optimism, it is easy to see how such a device could be misused by the
government or partisan groups.7 In particular, the stark dataasymmetry between constituent and government places all the
power of data in the hands of the government without transparency
and accountability to the citizens producing the data. Citizens
would be unable to know how their data is processed or aggregated,
nor would the government be obligated to reveal what a citizen’s
data reveals compared to historical trends. The data could even be
used to identify and persecute political dissidents based on the
views born out of their data. Beer did anticipate these problems,
and he designed safeguards into the system in order to foster visibility and transparency and ensure the process remained analog to
keep a citizen’s meter anonymous.8
Today, political consultants, technologists, and entrepreneurs
are all helping American politicians effect even larger dataasymmetries by gathering data on citizens through more advanced
tools of monitoring and persuasion, and with even fewer safeguards. With these data services,9 campaigns have access to massive electronic databases containing information gleaned and purchased from public and private sources on nearly every voter in the
4

Id.
Id.
6
“Beer commissioned several prototype meters and used them in small group
experiments. They were never implemented as the form of real-time, adaptive political
communication that Beer imagined.” MEDINA, supra note 2, at 92.
7
“Despite Beer’s good intentions, it is easy to imagine how a government might
abuse such a device or how partisan groups might manipulate them to suit their
interests.” Id. at 91.
8
“Beer recognized that the meters, like the telephone voting systems already in
existence at the time, brought with them the potential for political oppression … [He]
insisted that the devices be analog, not digital, which would make it more difficult to
identify individual meters and, by extension, individual users.” Id.
9
See infra Parts I.A–C.
5
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United States.10 The public data, in part, is composed of lists of
registered voters and can be obtained from official voter lists and
records maintained by states.11 The private data is more emblematic of “Big Data,” encompassing a galaxy of information purchased
from data brokers and revealing a limitless range of consumer habits including magazine subscription records, credit histories, and
even grocery “club card” purchases.12 With all this data, campaigns can use powerful analytic tools to distill myriad disjointed
and seemingly innocuous data points into an individualized voter
profile that reveals intimate details about a voter’s life and behavior.13 These profiles allow campaigns to craft messages individually tailored to a voter’s attitudes or ideology as well as economize
campaign resources by focusing only on “persuadables.”14
Most citizens, as they engage in their roles as consumers and
voters, do not appreciate the degree to which their data is freely
traded in data markets. As a matter of law, when an individual freely discloses their data to a third party, online or offline, there is no
reasonable expectation that the data can be kept private15 (barring
certain types of data protected by federal statute).16 Very few
people are aware that their data is being shipped off and aggregated
in data warehouses where it is organized, stored, and analyzed.17
This is partly due to the passive role users play in micro-targeting
practices, which for the most part are surreptitious by design. For
10

Chris Evans, It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the
Information Age, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 867, 867–68 (2012).
11
See infra Part I.C.
12
“An everyday example of data gathering occurs at supermarkets, which use
information they obtain from customer loyalty cards to send consumers targeted coupons
and advertisements.” Preston N. Thomas, Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case for a Right of
Audit in Private Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 158 (2009); see also Daniel
Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political Data, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 70, 71 (2012).
13
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all.
14
See Kreiss, supra note 12.
15
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 (2006)
(explaining the third-party doctrine); see also Evans, supra note 10, at 879 (“The parties to
a financial transaction are said to equally own the facts to the transaction.”).
16
See Evans, supra note 10.
17
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 121
(2004).
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example, a practice known as “cookie matching” allows marketers
to serve advertising to users based on data aggregated by actors not
present at the initial transaction that generated the data.18 Given
the surreptitious and unexpected nature of micro-targeting trends
like cookie matching and more,19 voters lack the notice necessary to
exercise autonomy over their data held in the private databases of
political data companies. With more autonomy, voters can minimize privacy and democracy harms associated with political data
practices, like the data’s capacity to socially engineer voters in unfair or impermissible ways,20 the potential political chilling effect
caused by unaccountable, imperceptible, and pervasive surveillance,21 and the power imbalances perpetuated by unregulated
“black box” algorithms.22
All of this matters because political campaigns are increasingly
interacting with voters based on data and shaping the nature of that
interaction based on what the data reveals.23 Much of this data is
proprietary and unregulated,24 which prevents voters from knowing what their would-be elected officials know about them or how
they have used their data to surreptitiously influence and persuade
them. Without knowledge of or autonomy over data, voters are increasingly at the mercy of a “one-way mirror”25 that scrutinizes
intimate details about their lives, judges them on that basis, and
surreptitiously influences their behavior. Given the essential role
the right to vote plays in ensuring our government serves its
people, it is necessary to understand the ways in which a loss of informational autonomy can harm voters when they exercise that essential right, and explore ways to mitigate that harm.
This Note will argue that, when voters lose informational autonomy, democratic harms can result. It will examine the legal ba18

Evans, supra note 10, at 879.
See infra Part I.C.
20
See infra Part II.C.
21
Id.
22
See infra Part II.C.3.
23
See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, How Big Data Sucked the Soul Out of Democratic Politics, THE
WEEK (Nov. 6, 2014) http://theweek.com/article/index/271411/how-big-data-suckedthe-soul-out-of-democratic-politics.
24
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3, 193 (2015).
25
I borrow the term “one-way mirror” from Frank Pasquale. Id. at 9.
19
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sis for federal and state regulation and will discuss legislative or
regulatory options at the federal and state level. Part I will provide
additional context about political data practices, describe the organizations that track it, and examine where the data comes from.
Part II will discuss the theoretical underpinnings behind informational autonomy and discuss the various ways Big Data political
trackers can harm normative conceptions of privacy and democracy. Part III will discuss challenges to reforming political data practices and explain why regulation is necessary. Part IV will examine
various federal and state regulatory reforms and provide a legal basis for federal and state regulation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Computational Politics
Given the promise of effective insights into voter behavior, it is
no wonder that campaigns are availing themselves of larger and
more diverse datasets. A famous example of this trend is the Obama campaign’s Facebook app, “Obama 2012 - Are You In?” At
the height of the campaign the app boasted 23 million unique users.
Each user gave up personal information like his or her name, gender, birthday, current city, religion, and political views as well as
shared their list of friends, the information they shared with
friends, and the information those friends shared on Facebook.26
The data was used to improve voter communication in every facet
of the campaign, from individually crafted online display advertising to personalized appeals used for offline get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) operations like signing up volunteers, knocking on doors,
phone banking, and identifying likely voters.27 With so much data
the campaign was able to engage previously untapped voters and
expand Democratic political participation.28
26

Micah Sifry, How Obama’s Data-Crunching Prowess May Get Him Re-Elected, CNN
(Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/09/tech/innovation/obama-data-crunch
ing-election/.
27
Id.
28
Kreiss, supra note 12, at 74; John McCormick, Democrats Keep Voter Registration
Lead in 4 Key States, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-10-10/democrats-keep-voter-registration-lead-in-4-battleground-states.html.
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A more recent example would be the Koch Brothers-backed political data firm, i360.29 i360 has spent 50 million dollars to link lists
of registered voters with consumer data purchased from credit bureaus, information from social networks, estimated income, recent
addresses, voter history, the brand of car a voter drives, and his or
her TV viewing habits.30 This was in order to help campaigns target ads more precisely and cost effectively.31 A number of Republican Senate and gubernatorial candidates that were victorious during the 2014 elections count themselves among i360’s clients, including Tom Cotton, Joni Ernst, and Larry Hogan.32
Indeed, electronically stored data used for political purposes is
nothing new. Political parties have for decades legally maintained
membership lists and voter management databases used in every
facet of a campaign, including fundraising, GOTV operations, recruitment of volunteers, and the tracking of issues across key geographic and demographic constituencies.33 It should also come as
no surprise that political campaigns are in the advertising and marketing business and that the ties between consumer data brokers,34
parties, and campaigns run deep.35 Even Acxiom, the country’s
largest consumer data broker, began in 1969 as a data processing

29
30

I360, http://www.i-360.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).

Mike Allen & Kenneth P. Vogel Inside the Koch Data Mine, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/koch-brothers-rnc-113359.html.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Colin Bennett, The Politics of Privacy and the Privacy of Politics: Parties, Elections and
Voter Surveillance in Western Democracies, 18(8) FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 5, 2013), available
at http://uncommonculture.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4789/3730.
34
“Data brokers are companies that collect information, including personal
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling
such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an
individual’s identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial
fraud.” FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (Mar.
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
35
“We also know that U.S. parties make extensive use of commercial marketing
databases. Thus the political data on party affiliation and behavior is combined with other
data on activities, interests and purchasing habits available from data brokerage firms such
as Acxiom, Dun and Bradstreet, InfoUSA and aristotle.com.” Bennett, supra note 33.
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company for the Democratic party.36 What has changed in recent
years is that campaigns are now utilizing advancements in data
tracking and storage to find novel ways to combine diverse digital
datasets and use statistics and other data mining techniques to extract hidden information and surprising correlations.37 This trend
was precipitated by the exponential decrease in the cost for storing,
managing, and analyzing large diverse sets of data.38
This phenomenon is called “computational politics,” and it refers to the application of computational methods to large datasets
derived from online and offline data sources for conducting outreach, persuasion, and mobilization in the service of electing, furthering, or opposing a candidate, policy, or legislation.39 For example, as a forerunner in this area,40 the 2012 Obama campaign developed a “likelihood of turnout” index based on public and private
datasets including consumer data on a massive nationwide scale.41
The index was a number generated between 0 (not going to vote)
to 100 (will certainly vote) for each potential voter.42 This number
was appended to every voter, and served as a simple and efficient
heuristic for campaign staffers to target the right voters at the right
time in their online and offline GOTV efforts.43 The index also allowed the campaign to dive deep into parts of the country thought

36

Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-cons
umer-database-marketing.html.
37
“Big Data … may be understood as a more powerful form of data mining that relies
on huge volumes of data, faster computers, and new analytic techniques to discover
hidden and surprising correlations.” Ira S. Rubenstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a
New Beginning?, 3 INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 74 (2013).
38
David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data 2 (Harvard
Kennedy Sch. Working Paper Series, No. RWP13-045, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354474.
39
Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational
Politics, 19(7) FIRST MONDAY (July 7, 2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/
fm.v19i7.4901.
40
Sasha Issenberg, How President Obama’s Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Individual
Voters, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/
featuredstory/509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-voters/.
41
Tufekci, supra note 39.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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to be Republican enclaves, and pick off individual voters never before targeted by Democrats.44
B. Political Data Firms
A popular narrative after the 2012 elections was that Democrats won the election with good data,45 and the GOP lost because
of bad data.46 In the intervening years there has been a land rush of
partisan and non-partisan political firms incorporating sophisticated voter data services into their suite of campaign products.47
Products like mobile applications allow canvassers to access data in
real time and generate relevant lists for telephone marketing, email
marketing, and door-to-door canvassing.48 These firms develop
these products in order to vie for the business of campaigns and
candidates. Because these firms are proprietary about their data
and computational practices, it is difficult to know how much they
really know about American voters beyond what they choose to reveal in press releases and promotional material. However, what
44

Id.
See Issenberg supra note 40; Dan Balz, How the Obama Campaign Won the Race for
Voter Data, WASH. POST, July, 28 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/howthe-obama-campaign-won-the-race-for-voter-data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-ee4e-11e2-a1f9ea873b7e0424_story.html; Andrew Lampitt, The Real Story of How Big Data Analytics
Helped Obama Win, INFOWORLD (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/
2613587/big-data/the-real-story-of-how-big-data-analytics-helped-obama-win.html.
46
The Republican party voiced concerns about their 2012 data operations in the socalled “GOP Autopsy Report,” stating: “To win campaigns, the GOP needs better data,
better access to data, and better tools to make the most of that data. Although the RNC
has always made significant investment in data, there is significant remaining work to do
to ensure that our data is the best it can be.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., GROWTH &
OPPORTUNITY PROJECT 28 (2013), available at http://growthopp.gop.com/
RNC_Growth_Opportunity_Book_2013.pdf; see also Kenneth P. Vogel & Maggie
Haberman, Karl Rove, Koch Brothers Lead Charge to Control Republican Data, POLITICO
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/karl-rove-koch-brotherscontrol-republican-data-90385.html.
47
NGP VAN is a progressive service offering Data Analytics, Voter File Management,
Volunteer Management, RoboCalls, and RoboSurveys. See NGP VAN,
http://www.ngpvan.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). NationBuilder is a non-partisan
campaign platform that offers voter data, website management, and campaign finance
compliance services. See NATIONBUILDER, http://nationbuilder.com/ (last visited Dec.
19, 2014); VoterGravity is a conservative service that offers mobile apps for door-to-door
canvassing, phone banking software, and preloaded voter files. See Features, VOTER
GRAVITY, http://votergravity.com/features/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
48
See Bennett, supra note 33.
45
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little is known still paints a picture of widespread and pervasive
voter tracking across a diverse set of data.
i360, rVotes, and Voter Gravity are three notable conservativefacing companies that offer campaign software and voter data services. According to its website, i360 operates a database of “190+
million active voters and 250+ million U.S. consumers” and can
offer a campaign “hundreds of data points on every American adult
that is currently or potentially politically active.”49 rVotes boasts a
“Unified Voter Database” that contains a “voters’ position on the
issues, their voting history [and] their current contact information.”50 Voter Gravity offers an “Integrated Solution” that “integrates mobile technology and a web-based phone system through
one interface” with “an extensive database of every U.S. voter
with key data points, real time access to data collected and a userfriendly dashboard that helps you turn information into votes.”51
NGP VAN and Catalist are well known as the de facto data services for Democrats.52 NGP VAN offers field campaign software
and voter files used by the Obama campaign, with accurate 50-state
voter files appended with sets of consumer data for “the most sophisticated targeting.”53 Catalist offers data analytics that give
campaigns insight into voters “such as relative likelihood to turn
out to vote [and] likelihood to be married or have a college degree,
to name just a few.”54
As for nonpartisan firms, Aristotle Inc. has proven to be one of
the most dominant.55 According to its website, Aristotle “provides
49

I360, http://www.i-360.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
RVOTES, http://www.rvotes.com/?p=931 (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
51
Features, VOTER GRAVITY, http://votergravity.com/features/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2014).
52
“Democrats built their voter data advantage partly because their data is more
centralized. A few well-connected firms like Catalist and NGP VAN have earned de facto
endorsements from the Democratic establishment and used those blessings to build near
monopolies on the left. As a result, Democratic candidates and liberal interest groups
have benefited from enhancing and sharing the same data through the same interfaces.”
See Vogel & Haberman, supra note 46.
53
SmartVAN, NGP VAN, http://www.ngpvan.com/smartvan (last visited Dec. 19,
2014).
54
Products, CATALIST, http://www.catalist.us/product (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
55
“[M]ost … candidates employ some data-mining firm that learned its business in
part from Aristotle, which has served as a consultant for every president since Ronald
50
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high-quality political data for political organizations, campaigns,
consultants and governmental agencies worldwide.”56 Aristotle has
an ever-growing database of more than 190 million voters. Its CEO
John Phillips touts the more than 500 attributes his company tracks
on each voter—“such as interests and charitable causes, educational level, homeowner/renter, estimated income or presence of
children in the household.”57
All of these firms operate on a longstanding principle of campaigning: identify and mobilize voters that are likely to vote for
your candidate, and avoid wasting time on the rest.58 Increasingly,
campaigns are using political data firms in order to harness massive
datasets of information on individual voters in order to microtarget on the individual level. In the past, campaigns had to rely on
demographic proxies for persuadability like “race, union membership, residential geography, and voter registration” information.59
Now, services like Aristotle can dive deeper and sort voters by utilizing hundreds of data points that help boost the signal of individual “persuadables” submerged in larger demographic groups.60
Instead of simply targeting “women voters” or “minority voters,”
campaigns have enough data to accurately profile the libertarian
white male in Cobb County, Georgia, or the socially conservative
Reagan .… In the 2006 elections, Aristotle sold information to more than 200 candidates
for the House of Representatives (even its Republicans had an astounding win record), a
good portion of those running for Senate, and candidates for governor from California to
Florida, to New York.” James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/12/aristotle200712.
56
Accurate and Up-To-Date Voter Lists Covering U.S. and Abroad, ARISTOTLE,
http://aristotle.com/political-data/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
57
David Zax, Football Fans Vote Republican: Hardcore Data Miners Track ‘Neo Tribes’
with ‘Micro-Targeting,’ FAST COMPANY (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1807087/football-fans-vote-republican-hardcore-data-miners-track-neo-tribes-microtargeting.
58
“The goal of mining for data is not to figure out who is important in your district. It
is actually about figuring who not to spend any time with. The major source of waste in a
political campaign is to try to communicate with people you know are not going to vote
for you.” Philip Howard & Kris Erickson, Data Collection and Leakage, 84 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 737, 738 (2010); It is a tactic common among all marketers—political or otherwise—
to identify individuals as a “targets” or “waste.” See Joseph Turow, THE DAILY YOU 7
(2011).
59
Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for
Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1078 (2005).
60
Id.
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African-American in Chicago, and tailor a campaign message directly to them.61
C. The Sources of Data
Computational politics requires accurate and current lists of
registered voters from each state’s voter database. States are mandated under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to maintain
state-wide computerized voter registration databases, along with
uniform procedures for processing registration data.62 When citizens register to vote, most registration forms require a name, address, birth date, phone number, and party affiliation, among other
things.63 Publicly available records of individual voting history are
also maintained by states.64 State “sunshine”65 laws mandate disclosure of most public records barring exemptions similar to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).66 As a result, states—as a
matter of course—sell voter records and registration lists to political parties and candidates as well as non-partisan political data
firms.67
61

Id.
SASHA ISSENBERG, THE VICTORY LAB 245 (2012).
63
Kim Zetter, Mining the Vein of Voter Rolls, WIRED (DEC. 11, 2003),
http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2003/12/61507. “All states require
voters to provide their name, address and signature; Every state but one requires voters to
provide their date of birth; 46 states ask voters to provide their phone number; 34 states
ask voters to declare their gender; 30 states ask voters to provide all or part of their Social
Security number; 27 states require voters to select a party affiliation; 14 states ask voters
to provide their place of birth; Eleven states ask voters for their drivers’ license number;
Nine states ask voters to declare their race; Four states ask voters if they need special
assistance at the polls; Three states require voters to provide a parent’s name; Two states
ask voters to provide an email address; One state, Arizona, requires voters to state their
occupation.” CAL. VOTER FOUND., VOTER PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (June 9, 2004),
available
at
http://www.calvoter.org/issues/votprivacy/pub/voterprivacy/keyfind
ings.html.
64
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002).
65
Id. at 1160.
66
Id. at 1163.
67
See Zetter, supra note 63. “Voter data is widely disseminated to secondary users,
including commercial interests in 22 states, typically without any notice to voters that
their information will be shared: All states grant candidates and political parties access to
voter lists; 43 states use voter lists as a juror source list; 22 states allow unrestricted
access to voter lists, which permits the lists to be used for commercial purposes; Four
states grant scholars and academics access to voter lists under state statutes; Four states
62
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Demographic data from the U.S. Census is another form of data that has been used in political micro-targeting for a very long
time.68 Starting in 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau began releasing
more granular demographic information about race, ethnicity, age,
and family type at the level of city blocks.69 The data typically includes 800 households, in three dozen demographic categories—
each attached to a nine-digit ZIP code.70
Data is also acquired from voters directly by parties and campaigns through a variety of online and offline sources. For example,
a campaign’s website requires voters to volunteer personal information whenever they sign up to volunteer, receive campaign
communications, or donate. Facebook apps,71 until recently,72 have
also proven to be a valuable source for campaigns to track users and
their friends.73 Campaigns also maintain records of offline engagement at rallies and volunteer events, all typically recorded by canvassers,74 and they receive data from political parties, who maintain
their own set of data collected over a longer period of time, which
typically includes donor data, voter history, attendance at party
events, data on volunteers, and information collected by canvassers.75 Campaigns are also utilizing data received from online tracking cookies76 that monitor a voter’s web traffic.77 When working in
grant journalists access to voter lists under state statutes.” See CAL. VOTER FOUND.,
supra note 63.
68
See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 42.
69
Id. at 59.
70
Id. at 59.
71
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES USE THE WEB AND
SOCIAL MEDIA (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.journalism.org/2012/08/15/
how-presidential-candidates-use-web-and-social-media/.
72
Luke Shuman, A Facebook Change Makes It Harder for Political Campaigns to See Your
Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/upshot/afacebook-change-makes-it-harder-for-political-campaigns-to-see-your-friends.html?ref
=politics&abt=0002&abg=0.
73
See Sifry, supra note 26.
74
Tim Murphy, Inside the Obama Campaign’s Hard Drive, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2012)
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/harper-reed-obama-campaignmicrotargeting.
75
Id.
76
“A cookie is a very simple text file that gets downloaded onto your PC when you
visit a website. They generally contain two bits of information: a site name and a unique
user ID. Once the cookie is on your computer, the site ‘knows’ that you have been there
before and can then use that knowledge to tailor the experience that you have. The vast
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tandem with online advertising exchanges and media partners, a
tracking cookie can serve ads personalized to an individual voter
based on the data surveyed.78 For example, eXelate, one of the
largest behavioral targeting firms, tracks 200 million unique individuals per month through cookies that track a user’s web traffic.79
These cookies are able to determine a user’s age, sex, ethnicity,
marital status, and profession as well as predict what items a user is
looking to purchase based on web searches and sites frequented.80
Ads are served utilizing eXelate data in a process where marketers
bid to cookie match their own cookies with eXelate’s cookies and
identify potential targets.81
As mentioned earlier, campaigns also rely on consumer data for
their micro-targeting efforts.82 Consumer data is a diverse category
of data typically acquired by campaigns, parties, and political data
firms from data brokers like Acxiom or Experian.83 Consumer data
can reflect a voter’s buying patterns, lifestyle, demographics, and
more. For example, Experian’s website has a category for “LifeEvent Triggers” and advertises the company’s ability to predict
when individuals are new parents, homeowners, or have recently
moved.84 Datalogix is a consumer data broker that allows its clients
to target SUV drivers, green consumers, and pet owners, and segments individuals into 700 data categories based on their past purchasing habits, demographics, and financial data.85 These various
majority of commercial websites—be they major online publishers, banks or ecommerce
sites—will use them.” Olivia Solon, A Simple Guide to Cookies and How to Comply with EU
Cookie Law, WIRED (May 25, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/201205/25/cookies-made-simple.
77
“[Companies are] combining records from voter registration and records purchased
from consumer data brokers and cookie-based profiles into very large troves of data about
individual voters and their preferences and attitudes that are all things that are used for
targeting purposes.” Meg Schwenzfeier, Consumer Data Privacy in Politics, PULITZER
CENTER ON CRISIS REPORTING (Feb. 21, 2014), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/
north-america-united-states-political-campaigns-consumer-data-privacy.
78
See Issenberg, supra note 40.
79
See TUROW, supra note 58, at 79.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 80.
82
See supra text accompanying notes 10–14.
83
See Kreiss, supra note 12, at 71; see also ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 174–75.
84
See Schwenzfeier, supra note 77.
85
Id.
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consumer data points are then combined with publicly available
data like voter history, party affiliation, or age, or a campaign’s internal data to enable campaigns to target voters more precisely.86
For example, Aristotle appends consumer data to voter lists purchased from state voter databases, allowing its clients to search
voters based on home purchase price, credit rating, pet ownership,
or refinance loan type.87
II. PRIVACY AND DEMOCRACY
In order to understand how computational politics can harm a
voter’s informational autonomy, and by extension privacy and democracy, it is important to first understand the theoretical underpinnings of informational autonomy and how it relates to normative
conceptions of privacy and democracy.
A. Theoretical Underpinnings
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously situated
privacy in “the right to be let alone.”88 In their article, Warren and
Brandeis were decrying a new technology of the day, smaller cameras that could take an “instantaneous photograph,” allowing
journalists to surreptitiously snap photos of private persons without their consent.89 In the past, getting your picture taken was an
ordeal that required sitting and posing for hours, and cameras were
too large, bulky, and expensive to be portable.90 With the advent of
new technologies, Warren and Brandeis feared that people would
be powerless to keep their personal image private or control how it
is used.91
86

“I might use your vote history, meaning what elections did you participate in, are
you registered with one of the parties, what’s your age, and what’s your income, things
like that …. And that information is combined with commercially available data and takes
into account your buying patterns, lifestyle patterns, demographics, all kinds of other
data.” Id.
87
Premium
Enhancements,
ARISTOTLE,
http://www.aristotle.com/politicaldata/premium-enhancements/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
88
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
89
Id. at 195–96; see also Solove, supra note 15, at 532.
90
See Solove, supra note 15, at 532.
91
Id.
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Essential in Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy—
whether they knew at the time or not92—is a conception of privacy
as informational autonomy. Professor Alan Westin took a similar
approach in his oft-quoted definition of privacy, calling privacy the
“claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.”93 Paul Schwartz also takes an informational autonomy approach, describing privacy as “[seeking] to
achieve informational self-determination through individual stewardship of personal data, and by keeping information isolated
from access.”94 The Supreme Court also recognized that “the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass
the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”95 Key to all of these analyses is a conception of informational
autonomy as the right of individuals to determine for themselves
how their personally identified information (PII)96 can be used, a
principle that is also reflected in most privacy protection laws.97
Indeed, privacy, self-determination, and personal autonomy
serve as essential elements for democratic governance. Paul
Schwartz has compared Internet surveillance to George Orwell’s

92

Warren and Brandeis did not describe the unauthorized photograph as
“information,” but their concern about the information conveyed in the unauthorized
photographs—and what that may suggest about the subject’s reputation—does suggest
that they were prefiguring what would later be known as “information privacy.” See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 88.
93
See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
94
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000).
95
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
96
“The term ‘personally identifiable information’ refers to information which can be
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security
number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or
identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES n.1 (2007).
97
“Privacy laws in their various forms usually prohibit the release of personally
identifiable information …. Information is personally identifiable if it can be traced to a
specific individual.” Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 6–7 (2011).
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telescreen,98 and he concluded that the harm to a citizen’s selfdetermination from Internet surveillance is more potent due to
“data storage possibilities and efficient search possibilities in any
database using complex algorithms and other techniques of data
mining.”99 Ruth Gavison also echoed the importance of privacy in
a “democratic government because it fosters and encourages the
moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”100 Neil Richards argues that informational autonomy shapes
the struggle “between individuals on the one hand and the corporate and government entities that seek information about them on
the other.”101 An example from German law states: “[A] person
who cannot oversee with sufficient certainty which of the information about him is known in … his social environment, and who is
unable to evaluate the knowledge of a possible communication
partner, can be greatly inhibited in his freedom to decide or plan in
personal self-determination.”102 This inhibition takes the form of
“forced obedience,” which can eventuate when the state and private organizations can “transform themselves into omnipotent
parents and the rest of society into helpless children.”103 Joel Reidenberg also writes that adequate standards for the treatment of
personal information are a necessary condition for citizen participation in a democracy,104 citing an analog from ancient Greece, where
98

Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1656
(1999) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6 (Penguin Books 1954) (1949)).
99
Id. at 1702 n.294.
100
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980)
101
Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1092
(2006). “The problem with databases does not stem from any specific act, but is a
systemic issue of power caused by the combination of relatively small actions, each of
which when viewed in isolation would appear quite innocuous. Many modern privacy
problems are the product of information flows, which occur between a variety of different
entities. There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is spread among a multitude of
actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each doing different things at different
times.” Daniel J. D’Amico, Book Review, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 537, 541 (2005)
(reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2004)).
102
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 562 (1995).
103
Id. at 560.
104
“Politically, adequate standards for the treatment of personal information are a
necessary condition for citizen participation in a democracy. Since ancient Greece, a
citizen’s right to participate in society has depended on the ability to control the
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a “citizen’s right to participate in society has depended on the ability to control the disclosure of personal information.”105
However, what are we to make of the non-governmental status
computational politicians enjoy? Is it fair to assume that normative
conceptions of privacy and democracy have purchase when the
agent conducting the surveillance and social engineering is a nonprofit political party, campaign, or for-profit corporation? The answer must be that the distinction should not matter given the important role private institutions do play—and must play—in our
electoral process. Moreover, privacy harms are not totally alleviated by the fact that private institutions largely engage in computational politics. No doubt, federal106 and state107 institutions are
incredibly secretive about their data, but citizens do have some levers to pull, whether it be via sunshine laws or the political process.
Parties, campaigns, and corporations that engage in computational
politics are very proprietary about the PII they have gathered and
their analytical methodologies,108 and guard data closely out of fear
that partisan opponents will gain access.109 It is arguable that indisclosure of personal information. Without appropriate standards, citizens may be
unduly constrained in their interactions with society. Socially, the treatment of personal
information is an element of basic human dignity. Fair treatment of personal information
accords respect to an individual’s personality. Standards, thus, structure social
relationships.” Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 497–98 (1995).
105
Id.
106
“[E]xisting policies of online transparency are largely developed for the sake of
public accountability, but fail to achieve it. In some cases, appropriate transparency
requirements exist but are not enforced. In other instances, transparency policies allow
agencies considerable discretion to decide which information will be disclosed. In still
other cases, transparency policies target information that is irrelevant for purposes of
public accountability. To realize the unfulfilled potential of open government, an
alternative regulatory regime is required.” Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency with(Out)
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 140
(2012).
107
See Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of
FOIA, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 387, 416 (2010) (describing the need for FOI litigation in some
states because state and local officials can be antagonistic and uncooperative with those
that request information).
108
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 3, 193.
109
“The 50-state voter file, which is available for the first time to organizations other
than the Obama campaign and Democratic candidates (but not to Republicans or
Republicans fronts), is updated over 200 times each year.” SmartVAN, NGP VAN,
https://www.ngpvan.com/smartvan (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
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formational autonomy is even more at stake when private unregulated actors trade in PII, especially if legislators are likely to exempt
political data from any larger data privacy regulatory regime out of
self-interest.110
B. Fair Information Practices
While informational autonomy is a well-developed principle in
legal theory111 and in legal doctrine,112 harms to informational autonomy caused by computational politics are in no way illegal. Federal privacy laws that mandate protections for PII, like the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),113 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),114 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),115 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,116 and Privacy

110

“‘Often when data laws are being proposed and put forward, the politicians exempt
themselves,’ said Don Hinman, senior VP for data strategy at Epsilon, which gets some of
its data from political advertisers but mainly is a purveyor of consumer information.”
Kate Kaye, Obama’s Approach to Big Data: Do As I Say, Not As I Do, ADVERTISING AGE
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://adage.com/article/digital/obama-s-approach-big-d=ata-ii/238346/.
111
See supra Part II.A.
112
“To begin with, both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy
encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.” U.S.
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
113
15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000). “COPPA imposes certain requirements on operators of
websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of
other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting
personal information online from a child under 13 years of age.” Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule (“COPPA”), FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemakingregulatory-reform-proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule (last visited Dec.
19, 2014).
114
FCRA requires consumer credit reporting companies to adopt procedures for
consumer information that are fair and equitable with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
115
HIPAA’s “privacy rule” limits the use of “protected health information.” See 42
U.S.C. § 1320d(1)–(8) (2002).
116
“The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act requires financial institutions—companies that
offer consumers financial products or services like loans, financial or investment advice,
or insurance—to explain their information-sharing practices to their customers and to
safeguard sensitive data.” Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, FTC, http://business.ftc.gov/
privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-bliley-act (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); see also 15
U.S.C. § 6801 (2006).
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Act,117 are either too narrow so as not to apply to computational
politics or only apply to governmental data practices.
However, all of these laws safeguard informational autonomy
because they incorporate a longstanding principle in federal and
state data and computer record-keeping practices known as “fair
information practices” (FIPs). The principle was first applied to
computer databases in a 1973 report by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in which the agency acknowledged potential harms to individuals when they lack control
over personal information.118 The report set forth several “Fair Information Practices,”119 including that “[t]here must be a way for
an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.”120 This principle influenced the Privacy Act
of 1974,121 the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995,122 and others.123 FIPs vary in definition and implementation, but Professor
Paul F. Schwartz helpfully distills them into four basic requirements: “(1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data;
(2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited procedural and
substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.”124

117
“The Privacy Act of 1974 … establishes a code of fair information practices that
governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about
individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.” Privacy Act of
1974, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
118
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. (OS)73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973) [hereinafter SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM.]; see also Lillian
R. Bevier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on
Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 462 (1995).
119
Solove, supra note 15, at 520.
120
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 118; see also Solove, supra note 15, at 520.
121
Solove, supra note 15, at 520.
122
Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
123
Solove, supra note 15, at 520.
124
Schwartz, supra note 98, at 1614.
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FIPs can serve to safeguard democracy by defining the terms of
individual participation in social and political life.125 Schwartz has
linked the FIPs to the preservation of democratic order, “by providing access to one’s personal data [and] information about how it
will be processed,” as well as how “the law seeks to structure the
terms on which individuals confront the information demands of
the community, private bureaucratic entities, and the State.”126
Applying FIPs in computational politics can remediate harms
to informational autonomy and democracy in three ways. First,
transparency could mitigate the surreptitious nature of datagathering in many online and offline scenarios. If computational
politicians reveal to voters how their data is gathered, who it is being shared with, and how it is being processed, voters will be more
aware of campaign practices that seek to influence or manipulate in
ways they may disapprove of. Second, “defined obligations” and
“procedural and substantive rights” can afford voters the control
necessary to make changes to data once it has been revealed to
them, either by correcting false data, removing data that they no
longer want on file, or opting out of tracking all together. Lastly, by
offering more transparency and control to voters, campaigns can
improve upon a system of data collection premised on a legal
framework for consent that is more or less a sham. Although voters
“voluntarily” disclose their information to campaigns, websites,
and many other consumer services, they almost universally fail to
appreciate the degree to which companies, campaigns, and political
parties retain the right to freely trade their data in an endless chain
of secondary and tertiary uses. FIPs can improve this system by
informing voters if their data will be traded for secondary uses and
allowing them the choice to restrict subsequent uses or even opt
out altogether.
C. Informational Privacy Harms
Like Warren and Brandeis’s camera, computational politics
harms privacy in ways dramatically different from anything pre-

125

Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2000).
126
Id.
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viously possible.127 Network computing, data storage, and comprehensive records of online behavior128 all allow private actors to surreptitiously monitor voter information for their own purposes.129
Privacy experts have connected the loss of informational autonomy
with a variety of harms to democracy, including discrimination,130
the chilling of political speech,131 and unaccountable “black box”
algorithms.132 This Note will now provide a brief summary of each,
and describe how they apply in the context of computational politics.
1. Discrimination
Computational politics can allow companies, parties, and campaigns to distinguish individual members submerged in groups
based on granular individual characteristics, preferences, and activities.133 Algorithms can then crunch the data and allow campaigns
and corporations to discriminate based on an infinite number of
data points and treat individuals differently on that basis.134 Predictive privacy harms can and do result when computational politicians discriminate between individuals based on their data profiles.135 A voter given a particular classification is saddled with any
“cascading disadvantages” associated with that particular classification.136 Disadvantages include “redlining,”137 where campaigns
127

Schwartz, supra note 98, at 1610–11.
Id.
129
Id.
130
See infra Part II.C.1.
131
See infra Part II.C.2.
132
See infra Part II.C.3.
133
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of
Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 351, 355 (2013).
134
See id.
135
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014); see also PASQUALE, supra
note 24, at 215.
136
See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 32.
137
“Redlining is an old term used to refer to the organizational practice of identifying
the parts of a community that are difficult or problematic to serve. Most often the term
refers to how organizations decide that some people, by virtue of neighborhood attributes
and perceptions, should be offered low standards of service and indenturing obligations.
These neighborhoods would be circled in red ink as places where insurance companies
would give uncompetitive rates, banks would have more demanding repayment plans,
government agencies would make fewer investments, or real estate developers would
128
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use data to ignore voters with attributes that suggest an unlikelihood to vote.138 According to Philip N. Howard, political campaigns
redline when they are “declining to serve a community if it is not
part of a sensitive electoral district or declining to serve individuals
if they are perceived to be less sensitive to the political issue.”139
For example, Howard argues that the ability to disengage with
“unlikely” or “unpersuadable” voters through modeling suggests
that campaigns can apply the “swing state” strategy deployed in
presidential politics but at the individual level140—meaning that
“non–voters” can be ignored while others can be flooded with
campaign material,141 introducing a new form of categorical inequality into our politics.142
Campaigns are redlining voters with audience segmentation
tools provided by political data firms. For example, in 2012, Aristotle partnered with Intermarkets, a digital ad firm and ad sales rep
for web publishers. The partnership combines Aristotle’s political
data with consumer data tracked from Intermarkets’ “cookie
pool” in order to “[segment] online audiences into groups political
advertisers want to target.”143 Another example is TargetSmart—
an active Democratic data firm during the 2014 midterms—which
segments voters based on data used by consumer marketers in order to model each voter based on a persuadability factor,144 not unlike the Obama campaign’s strategy in 2012.145 [x+1] Inc.,146 a company that provides artificial intelligence advertising solutions for
refuse to build new ventures.” See PHILLIP N. HOWARD, NEW MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND
THE MANAGED CITIZEN 132 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
138
Kreiss, supra note 12, at 73–74.
139
See HOWARD, supra note 137, at 133.
140
See Tufekci, supra note 39.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Kate Kaye, Intermarkets Pairs With Lotame to Enhance Aristotle Data Relationship,
CLICKZ (July 23, 2012), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/2193317/intermarketspairs-with-lotame-to-enhance-aristotle-data-relationship.
144
The Numbers Behind ‘The Persuadables,’ BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-27/the-numbers-behind-thepersuadables.
145
Sifry, supra note 26.
146
Now acquired by Rocket Fuel. See Press Release, Rocket Fuel, Rocket Fuel to
Acquire [x+1] (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://rocketfuel.com/press_release/rocketfuel-to-acquire-x1.

1030

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:1007

digital marketers,147 including some politics and advocacy organizations,148 accesses massive databases of online behavior gathered
through tracking technologies across the web.149 [x+1] uses this data to help its clients draw assumptions about a target’s proclivities
and alter displayed ads for each individual based on his or her segment.150 A test subject during a Wall Street Journal investigation
was placed in a [x+1] segment called “White Picket Fences,”
meant for individuals who “live in small cities, have a median income of $53,901, are 25 to 44 years old with kids, work in whitecollar or service jobs, generally own their own home, and have
some college education.”151
There is also real concern that these algorithms can result in
discriminatory outcomes for members of protected classes. Algorithms can “find strong correlations, which result in discriminatory
outcomes while based on neutral factors.”152 For example, FTC
Chief Technologist Latanya Sweeney discovered how race can affect what types of ads are served by predictive online advertising.153
Sweeney discovered a disproportionate likelihood that advertisements for arrest-record searches appeared on websites with distinctly African-American qualities.154 Her research also demonstrated that these advertisements were 25 percent more likely to
show up on a search for distinctively black names when compared
to white names.155 Given the potential for harm,156 data scientists
like Cynthia Dwork have urged algorithms to be subjected to a
147

About Rocket Fuel, ROCKET FUEL, http://rocketfuel.com/about-rocketfuel#success_stories (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
148
Id.
149
Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703294
904575385532109190198.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 133, at 358–59; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at
38–39.
153
Laura Ryan, Feds Investigate ‘Discrimination by Algorithm,’ NAT’L J. (Sept. 15, 2014);
see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39.
154
Ryan, supra note 153; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39.
155
Ryan, supra note 153; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39.
156
Wade Henderson & Rashad Robinson, Big Data is a Civil Rights Issue, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Apr. 8, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/big-data-is-a-civilrights-issue.
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“fairness constraint,” through which an algorithm’s discriminatory outcomes are tested to see if similar individuals are treated similarly.157 Civil rights groups have urged for reforms as well, citing a
need for individual autonomy over personal information “that is
known to a corporation [that] can easily be used by companies and
the government against vulnerable populations, including women,
the formerly incarcerated, immigrants, religious minorities, the
LGBT community, and young people.”158 The White House Report on Big Data also warned that “big data analytics have the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health,
education, and the marketplace.”159
2. Chilling Effects
The knowledge that all consumer, Internet, and political transactions are surveilled, compiled, and sold can alter a citizen’s behavior and even chill political association.160 There are three reasons why associational chilling can occur when voters lose their
informational autonomy.
First, consumer data-mining practices are surreptitious, passive, and automatic.161 Voters are unable to predict when or how
their digital dossiers are being compiled and what the data suggests
about them.162 For example, campaigns compile voter lists containing the names and contact information of all voters that have inte157

Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness (Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~zemel/documents/fairAwareItcs2012.pdf.
158
Press Release, The Leadership Conference, Civil Rights Principles for the Era of Big
Data (2014), available at http://www.civilrights.org/press/2014/civil-rights-principlesbig-data.html.
159
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES (May 1, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at
38.
160
Evans, supra note 10, at 882. For an example of a complainant alleging the chilling of
associational rights due to governmental data-gathering, see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11
(1972); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating that associational disclosure can result in
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility).
161
See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
162
Id.

1032

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:1007

racted with the campaign online and offline.163 These lists are then
matched with data firms like Aristotle, which lay bare a voter’s
consumer habits along with models for persuadability or other algorithmic judgments.164
Second, because campaigns are subjected to practically no
regulation for the repurposing of political data, voters are unable to
predict what other campaigns or candidates will benefit from their
data in the future. For example, the privacy policies used by both
candidates in the 2014 Kentucky Senate race lacked sufficient clarity about potential secondary use of voter data. Democratic candidate Alison Lundergran Grimes’s online privacy policy promises
not to share a voter’s data with third parties except with those
“candidates, organizations, campaigns, groups or causes that we
believe have similar political viewpoints, principles or objectives,”165 a policy that tracks with the Democratic National Committee’s own policy.166 Senator Mitch McConnell’s online privacy
policy does not even acknowledge third-party sharing of personal
information,167 but the Republican party reserves the right to share
data with like-minded organizations.168 Although the policies may
be short and comprehensible as is recommended by the FTC,169
they give little instruction as to what may happen to a voter’s personal information once the campaign is over.
163

See supra Part I.C.
Aristotle’s website advertises a “data matching” service that allows campaigns to
“match [their] list to [Aristotle’s] voter file and pull out records that [they] may want to
exclude from [their] database.” Data Matching, ARISTOTLE, http://aristotle.com/
political-data/data-matching/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
165
Privacy Policy, ALISON FOR KENTUCKY, http://alisonforkentucky.com/privacypolicy/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
166
Privacy Policy, DEMOCRATS, http://www.democrats.org/privacy_policy (last visited
Dec. 19, 2014).
167
Privacy Policy, TEAM MITCH, http://www.teammitch.com/privacy_policy (last
visited Dec. 19, 2014).
168
“We may share your information with like-minded organizations. The RNC may
share information—that you voluntarily provide us—with like-minded organizations
committed to the principles or candidates of the Republican Party, Republican State Party
organizations and local Republican groups. The RNC may provide your email address or
other personal information to authorized third parties required to deliver a particular
service. These third parties may not use said information for any other purpose than to
carry out the services they are performing for the RNC.” Terms & Conditions and Privacy
Policy, GOP, https://www.gop.com/privacy/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
169
FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at viii.
164
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Third, fear of discrimination and redlining can cause chilling effects. As discussed earlier, campaigns that engage in computational
politics are able to discriminate and profile the electorate in new
and powerful ways.170 Politicians can choose to under serve or ignore particular parts of their constituency based on what an algorithmic model tells them about that group’s electoral utility.171 Although the fear of redlining is nothing new,172 the addition of computational politics can make the practice a lot more harmful due to
its pervasive and surreptitious nature.
3. Black Boxes
Because computational politics involves opaque, latent, and sophisticated computer modeling to carry out highly effective campaigns of persuasion and social engineering, there are justifiable
concerns about the further accretion of political influence to a
wealthy and powerful few.173 This accretion of power is enhanced
by the loss of an individual’s informational autonomy which makes
mining the raw material for computational politics dirt cheap.174
But also, power is solidified due to the opacity of political data
firms that operate so-called “black box” algorithms in computational politics.175
As discussed earlier, computational politics is conducted surreptitiously and is subjected to little independent oversight.176 As a
result, private data practices are opaque and voters have no ability
to control—much less anticipate—when or how their data is collected or how it is used to distinguish them from other voters.177
Professor Frank Pasquale has discussed at length the potential
harms caused by opaque algorithms in search.178 Pasquale discusses
the role of Internet gatekeepers like Google, who operate informational bottlenecks that can “manipulate the flow of informa170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

See supra Part II.C.1.
Id.
HOWARD, supra note 137.
See generally Tufekci, supra note 39.
See generally PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 30–34.
See id. at 9–10.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 66.
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tion … [and suppress] some sources while highlighting others”
either because of intrinsic preferences or inducement from others.179 Lack of informational autonomy and oversight can facilitate
manipulation through unaccountable private “black-box”180 algorithms. Pasquale warns of a “black box society”181 where private
firms can lock away information even when there is a strong public
interest for disclosure.182 In Pasquale’s view, unaccountable Internet power can stifle innovation by manipulating the market in order
to maintain power and “pick winners” among content and application providers.183 For example, Facebook has demonstrated that its
proprietary algorithms can affect voter turnout,184 albeit by a slim
.39 percent, but enough to swing a close election.185 Jonathan Zittrain explains how Facebook, or another dominant social network,
could in the future affect electoral outcomes in far more insidious
ways,186 by using the Facebook newsfeed to only activate voters
that Facebook’s algorithms have identified as likely to support the
company’s favored candidate.187

179

Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1165 (2008); see also
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 67.
180
See Frank Pasquale, Battling Black Boxes, MADISONIAN.NET (Sept. 21, 2006),
http://madisonian.net/2006/09/21/battling-black-boxes/.
181
See generally PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 16–18.
182
Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers
and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 286 (2008).
183
Id. at 299; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 191–92.
184
Sifry, supra note 26.
185
See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 74.
186
“Now consider a hypothetical, hotly contested future election. Suppose that Mark
Zuckerberg personally favors whichever candidate you don’t like. He arranges for a
voting prompt to appear within the newsfeeds of tens of millions of active Facebook
users—but unlike in the 2010 experiment, the group that will not receive the message is
not chosen at random. Rather, Zuckerberg makes use of the fact that Facebook ‘likes’ can
predict political views and party affiliation, even beyond the many users who proudly
advertise those affiliations directly. With that knowledge, our hypothetical Zuck chooses
not to spice the feeds of users unsympathetic to his views. Such machinations then flip
the outcome of our hypothetical election. Should the law constrain this kind of
behavior?” Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever
Finding Out, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering. See also
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 74.
187
Id.
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Pasquale’s critiques of search and social networks can be analogized to computational politics. Political data firms like Aristotle
operate as informational gatekeepers and solidify their market dominance with exclusive contractual arrangements to consolidate
data with advertising firms,188 market research firms,189 and data
analytics firms.190 Market dominance can be used to affect particular political outcomes. In the case of partisan data operations it is
clear that computational tools are meant to affect a particular partisan outcome. As for non-partisan firms like Aristotle, there remains a concern that particular kinds of political outcomes or candidates can be prioritized. For example, the corporate leaders in
some of these non-partisan firms have deep ties with powerful D.C.
partisans,191 which can inform which clients a firm is willing to take
on192 or what business contracts to enter into.193 Beyond partisanship, computational politics can privilege a wealthier class of candidates and campaigns that can afford their highly effective and expensive suite of data services194 or who have spent years investing

188

Kaye, supra note 143.
For example, the market research firm Claritas has an exclusive data-sharing
arrangement with Aristotle. Verini, supra note 55.
190
Press Release, Evolving Strategies and Aristotle Introduce Groundbreaking Voter
Targeting Technology that Could Flip the Senate Next Month (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/evolving-strategies-and-aristotle-introducegroundbreaking-voter-targeting-technology-that-could-flip-the-senate-next-month278523401.html.
191
“[T]he companies Aristotle does business with have deep ties in Washington.
Acxiom’s recently retired CEO, Charles Morgan, is a longtime friend of Bill and Hillary
Clinton’s. Wesley Clark, the retired general and former Democratic presidential
candidate, used to sit on Acxiom’s board. Catalist, a data-mining firm providing voter lists
to the Clinton campaign in the 2008 race, is presided over by Harold Ickes Jr., Bill’s
onetime deputy chief of staff, and Laura Quinn, who held the same position in Al Gore’s
office. In 2005, the Department of Justice alone bought $19 million worth of records from
data miners, according to the Government Accountability Office.” Verini, supra note 55.
192
“F.E.C. filings from 2006–7 show, however, that the majority of Aristotle’s client
candidates were and are Republicans. Among them are former House majority leader
Tom DeLay and former California congressman Duke Cunningham. The National Rifle
Association was once Aristotle’s biggest client.” Id.
193
See Press Release, supra note 190.
194
See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 174–75 (describing the cost of commercial data
services from the country’s largest commercial data warehouses like InfoUSA, Acxiom,
and Experian).
189
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in expensive in-house data operations195—a problem that is compounded given the ever-increasing price of post-Citizens United
campaigning.196
III.

UNDERSTANDING HOW TO REFORM
COMPUTATIONAL POLITICS

A. Challenges
Given the role computational politics plays in influencing important political outcomes for all Americans, it is essential that voters are afforded some insight into and control over these systems.
Fundamentally, partisan and non-partisan political data firms are in
the business of information about voters and how they behave, and
that kind of information is only valuable if it is exclusive, and remains exclusive through the full power of copyright protections.197
Trade secrets make it impossible to test the fairness, validity, or
honesty behind algorithms used in computational politics.198 Successful firms in computational politics will not be evaluated for the
fairness, validity, or honesty behind their voter data,199 and instead
can only be judged on a reputation built on past successes.200
Meanwhile, the voters that make the system possible with their data will have no insight into or control over these important algorithms. In order to prevent the aforementioned privacy harms,201
195
“The Republican National Committee, which had already invested in a national
ground game, built an in-house data and analytics infrastructure. They tested their model
universe, making thousands of calls each week to voters in order to better refine their
targeting assumptions. And they used the special election in March in Florida’s 13th
Congressional District to quietly test their smartphone apps.” Ashley Parker, Chastened
Republicans Beat Democrats at Their Own Ground Game, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/politics/republicans-beat-democrats-at-theirown-ground-game.html.
196
The Money Behind the Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); Ian Vandewalker,
Outside Spending and Dark Money in Toss-Up Senate Races Post-Election Update, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/blog/
Post_Election_Spending.pdf.
197
See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 215.
198
Id. at 217.
199
Id. at 217–18.
200
Id.
201
See supra Parts II.C.1–3.
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regulatory regimes must be put in place to allow voters some access
to the data and algorithms behind computational politics.
But legislating strong data privacy protections is very difficult.202 Many proposals to regulate data are overly restrictive, under-protective, or both.203 In some cases, sophisticated data firms
will find a way to circumvent new restrictions and in so doing make
their services more valuable.204 Also, because legislating political
data protections necessarily implicates the First Amendment,205
restrictions that outright forbid tracking a citizen’s political beliefs—similar to the EU Privacy Directive—are simply not workable.206

202

“Of all reputation systems … credit scores are by far the most regulated. Yet
regulation has done little to improve them. Penalties for erroneous information on credit
reports are too low to merit serious attention from credit bureaus.” PASQUALE, supra note
24, at 191.
203
Id.; see also Evans, supra note 10, at 893–94.
204
“Johnson et al. recommend making donor data ‘read only’ to increase the cost of
importing such data into political databases. This would seem to only bar outsider
candidates with limited resources from using the data, while professional political dataminers will quickly find a way to work around the nuisance—making their service even
more valuable. They also propose limiting the lifespan of contributor data, but again,
professional data-miners could quickly find a work-around and mark up the cost of their
services.” See Evans, supra note 10, at 893–94.
205
“[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing
matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review
article: ‘The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public
or general interest’ …. One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an
attendant loss of privacy.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); see also Philip
N. Howard & Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative Perspective, 15(12) FIRST MONDAY
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http:// firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/2975/2627 (“On First Amendment grounds, provided they
remain non-state actors candidates and parties enjoy broad latitude with respect to their
data practices.”).
206
“The processing of personal data, revealing race or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religion or beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of genetic data or data
concerning health or sex life or criminal convictions or related security measures shall be
prohibited.” Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
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B. Reform Skeptics
Reform skeptics may understandably protest the regulation of a
lawful data industry. Citizens are freely giving away their informational autonomy. And why not—especially if more data results in
higher turnout,207 more relevant political ads,208 or if the private
data used by campaigns was given away in exchange for a service
like a discount at a supermarket check-out209 or for the use of a social network.210 Others may even question whether computational
politics truly predicts a voter’s actual behavior or reveals the
“truth” behind their behaviors or motivations; that “truth” may
not exist in any case.211
Indeed, computational politics can boost voter turnout. Facebook has demonstrated this with its experiments during the 2010
midterm election.212 Also, it is true that with more data, campaigns
can craft better appeals to individual voters and even motivate previously disengaged voters.213 An example of this from the 2012 Obama campaign was the use of Facebook to match supporters with
their friends living in swing states. Supporters were prompted with
a picture of their friend and were told to click a button to automatically urge those targeted voters to register to vote, vote early, or get
to the polls.214 According to the campaign, 1 in 5 people contacted
by a Facebook friend acted on the request, in large part because the
campaign was able to match supporters with people they knew and
207

See supra text accompanying notes 39–44.
Id.
209
Donna Ferguson, How Supermarkets Get Your Data—and What They Do with It, THE
GUARDIAN
(June
8,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/jun/
08/supermarkets-get-your-data.
210
Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS NEWS (Mar. 9,
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-informat
ion/.
211
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (2000).
212
Micah L. Sifry, Facebook Wants You to Vote on Tuesday. Here’s How It Messed With
Your Feed in 2012, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2014/10/can-voting-facebook-button-improve-voter-turnout.
213
See Evans, supra note 10, at 896.
214
Michael Scherer, Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama
Win, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secretworld-of-quants-and-data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/2/.
208
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deliver targeted appeals based on personal information received
through the campaign’s Facebook app.215
Although Facebook’s voting experiment appeared to be a great
public service, without better insight into the black boxes that conduct these experiments, there is no guarantee that future social
networks will be so benevolent. Also, the issue is not whether insights afforded by data are accurately portraying reality or if voters
are indeed receiving more relevant campaign ads. Rather, the issue
is who controls those modes of prediction,216 whether it works well
enough to affect outcomes, and whether that mechanism has any
obligation to remain accountable to the individuals whose data
serves as its raw material. This inquiry is more relevant because at
bottom, the point of political data is not to help campaigns become
more congenial to the attitudes of voters. The goal is to win elections—and the data suggests that it is helping.217 Data-driven targeting is not meant to merely enable choice by the target market;
rather it means to effectuate choice by the marketer.218 When a
communication is framed in order to become more attractive by
reflecting a target’s desires, it does not necessarily make the communication less manipulative.219 Manipulation can also be enhanced by the lack of meaningful consent on the part of voters.
Voters may consent to the initial use of their political information,
but most would not have consented to its continuous aggregation
and applications in unexpected ways.220

215

Id.
Cohen, supra note 211, at 1406.
217
“[Campaigns] develop predictive models that produce individual-level scores that
predict citizens’ likelihoods of performing certain political behaviors, supporting
candidates and issues, and responding to targeted interventions. The use of these scores
has increased dramatically during the last few election cycles. Simulations suggest that
these advances could yield sizable and electorally meaningful gains to campaigns that
harness them.” Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 38, at 27.
218
Cohen, supra note 211, at 1407.
219
Id.
220
Philip N. Howard, Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in
Political Campaign Strategy, 597 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 166 (2005).
216
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C. Applying the Fair Information Practices and First Amendment
Concerns
So if information wants to be free,221 how do we regulate it? On
what basis do legislators and regulators impose additional obligations on computational politicians—especially when the data was
acquired with consent, albeit passively? Answering this question
will require a return to the identifiable privacy interest at stake in
computational politics: informational autonomy.222
Informational autonomy advocates argue that individuals assert
a property interest over their personal information.223 With a property interest, an individual can assert control over use and protect
against misuse.224 The extent to which individuals ought to effect
control over data is disputed. On the one hand, enforcing privacy
rights as vigorously as copyright law may make progress in protecting privacy,225 but would also result in the blocking of the free flow
of data across the Internet, a proposition that raises clear First
Amendment concerns.226 No doubt, the proper regulatory regime
exists somewhere between these extremes.
Applying FIPs to computational politics would be the best way
to balance these competing concerns for two reasons. First, FIPs
221

Steward Brand, Keep Designing: How the Information Economy is Being Created and
Shaped by the Hacker Ethic, WHOLE EARTH REV. 44 (May 1985).
222
Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2190 (2004).
223
“To note that privacy talk is embedded in the discourse of property, of course, is to
beg the question whether reality is similarly embedded. Some philosophers argue that
privacy has meaning only to the extent that it is reducible to a property interest.” Cohen,
supra note 211, at 1379; see also Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295, 333–34 (1995) (describing a “quasi-property” interest in
informational privacy theory).
224
Lawrence Lessig, CODE VERSION 2.0 229 (2006).
225
Id. Moreover, algorithmic processes are premised on smooth, fast, and efficient
transactions; introducing reforms will probably slow things down and incur additional
expenses. PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 213.
226
Schwartz, supra note 223, at 333; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for
Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 743, 760 (2000) (describing desirous uses of personal information without
prior consent and the First Amendment concerns of limiting use through individual
consent). Most scholars addressing the cyber-property controversy concur, arguing that
property-rule protection for network resources is wholly inappropriate; this line of
argument guided the court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi. Bellia, supra note 222, at
2190.
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do not take away a private actor’s ability to speak in violation of the
First Amendment. FIPs one,227 two,228 and four229 regulate only
business practices of private entities without silencing speech.230
For example, FCRA imposes a defined transparency regime that
requires data companies to provide information used to evaluate a
consumer’s credit upon his request.231 Paul Schwartz has likened
FIP statutes like FCRA to regulating other uses of information in
the private sector such as food labeling,232 in that the regulation of
private sector information in order to ensure the goals of transparency, like fairness and accuracy, is an uncontroversial regulation
of speech. Second, the FIPs have enjoyed longstanding use in federal, state, and international information privacy protection law for
decades233 and have survived First Amendment challenges.234
Their use is battle-tested and uncontroversial.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE
AND REGULATORY REFORM

A. Regulatory Implementation of the Fair Information Practices
As stated earlier, implementing FIPs can foster individual autonomy in computational politics by promoting political data trans-

227

“(1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data.” See supra text
accompanying note 124.
228
“(2) transparent processing systems.” See supra text accompanying note 124.
229
“(4) external oversight.” See supra text accompanying note 124.
230
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1561–62.
231
15 U.S.C. § 1681(d) (2006). “No prevention of speech about anyone takes place, for
example, when the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 requires that certain information be
”
given to a consumer when an ‘investigative consumer report’ is prepared about her.
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1562.
232
“The First Amendment does not prevent the government from requiring product
labels on food products or the use of ‘plain English’ by publicly traded companies in
reports sent to their investors or Form 10-Ks filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.” Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1562.
233
See supra Part II.B.
234
The Federal Trade Commission’s ban on the sale of target marketing lists under
FCRA was not a violation of the credit reporting agency’s First Amendment rights under
intermediate scrutiny because “protecting the privacy of consumer credit information is
substantial.” See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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parency and encouraging choice on the part of voters.235 There are
plenty of statutes that have implemented FIPs that could serve as a
model for implementation in the computational politics context.236
For example, COPPA emphasizes transparency and choice for parents by requiring operators of any website that knowingly collects
personal information from children to provide notice on the site of
what information is collected, how the data is used, and whether
the data is shared with third parties.237 The Act also grants parents
the power to request their child’s data and block a website from
surveilling their child’s online activities in the future.238 COPPA is
instructive of how regulators could implement a regime that promotes transparency of data, gives voters choices about what to do
with their data, and provides options to opt out of future data gathering.
1. Transparency and Choice Portal
Fairness, in the collection of personal information, dictates that
the subject of the collection have at least as much information as
the entity collecting it.239 In order to foster fairness, voters need a
right to access the black box data behind computational politics. A
“right to access” is an uncontroversial FIP,240 which has been accepted by both government and private entities and is incorporated
into federal and state law as well as private business practices.241
Of course, a right to access would be meaningless without a
corresponding right to delete or correct data or disable future tracking.242 One such proposal would be a one-stop web portal where
computational politicians disclose voter data and offer voters a
235

INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK
(2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2010/
december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf.
236
See supra text accompanying notes 113–17.
237
15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i-ii) (2002).
238
15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(i-iii) (2002).
239
Preston N. Thomas, Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case for A Right of Audit in Private
Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 182 (2009).
240
Id. at 183.
241
Id.
242
“Merely being aware of the contents of a dossier provides little comfort or help to an
individual troubled by potential inaccuracies or misuses of that information.” Id.
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chance to correct or delete data or disable tracking. The regime
could mirror COPPA’s language and target websites and online
services that collect a voter’s data with knowledge and for political
purposes.
Also, centralized data clearinghouses spurned by government
regulation are not new. In response to the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003’s (FACTA)243 requirement that a consumer reporting agency offer free annual credit reports for consumers,244 a group of the largest consumer data firms (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion) created AnnualCreditReport.com,245 the
official, centralized source of free credit reports.246 A similar website could be used to disclose data used for computational politics,
including what kind of data is being gathered, what it reveals, and
who it is being shared with. Also, to ensure meaningful compliance,
regulators could impanel “data auditors,” government employees
charged with understanding commercial and political data practices
and detecting and deterring behaviors that violate FIPs or result in
harmful discriminatory outcomes.247
In a 2012 consumer privacy report, the Federal Trade Commission recommended that consumer data brokers maintain websites
where they could identify themselves to consumers, describe how
they collect and use consumer data, and detail the access rights and
other choices they provide with respect to the consumer data they
maintain.248 A similar website, but centrally operated by a federal
agency, could be an effective tool in order to foster FIPs in a computational politician’s data policies.

243

15 U.S.C. § 1681(j) (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(j) (2006).
245
ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM, https://www.annualcreditreport.com/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2014).
246
Thomas, supra note 239, at 191.
247
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 151; Thomas, supra note 239, at 172 (arguing that a
“right to audit” exists in the FIPs).
248
FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at v. Acxiom maintains such a website, allowing
consumers to access their data profiles and even stop future tracking. Katy Bachman,
Confessions of a Data Broker: Acxiom’s CEO Scott Howe Explains How Self-Regulation Can
Work, ADWEEK (Mar. 25, 2014), available at http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/
confessions-data-broker-156437.
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A centralized government-operated website has many benefits
over the self-regulation policy adopted by the FTC and seen in
FACTA. For instance, Experian, in a comment to the FTC,249
voiced privacy and security concerns regarding a right to access
and correction of data files, explaining that in order to identify a
user’s rights, a company engaging in self-regulation will need additional sensitive PII in order to authenticate a user’s request for data.250 If the government acts as the trustee and intermediary between trackers and voters, private companies will not need to
maintain sensitive records for authentication purposes. Also, many
commentators maintain that data is not always sold to third-party
companies with information that could individually identify any
one person.251 With a centralized hub, the government could verify
a voter’s identity using sensitive PII (e.g. Social Security number)
and aggregate all records maintained on that individual across all
political data companies that track him or her. In cases where the
data was sold to a third-party broker and later re-identified, such
information would then be available for the voter when the thirdparty broker discloses. Once a voter’s data is disclosed, the portal
could allow voters to make decisions about future tracking. This
could come in the form of centralized and user-friendly “do-nottrack” (DNT) mechanisms.252 The FTC has recommended that
consumer data brokers use DNT mechanisms but has decided
249

FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at 7 n.32 (citing Comment of Experian).
“One commenter raised concerns about granting access and correction rights to data
files used to prevent fraudulent activity, noting that such rights would create risks of fraud
and identity theft. This commenter also stated that companies would need to add
sensitive identifying information to their marketing databases in order to authenticate a
consumer’s request for information, and that the integration of multiple databases would
raise additional privacy and security risks.” Id. at 64.
251
“[C]ommenter pointed out that many marketers do not maintain records about data
sold to other companies on an individual basis. Thus, marketers have the ability to
identify the companies to which they have sold consumer data in general, but not the
third parties with which they may have shared the information about any individual
consumer.” Id. at 65.
252
In order to define DNT, one must first understand what “tracking” entails.
According to the Center for Democracy and Technology, “tracking” is defined as “the
collection and correlation of data about the Internet activities of a particular user,
computer, or device, over time and across non-commonly branded websites, for any
purpose other than fraud prevention or compliance with law enforcement requests.”
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., WHAT DOES ‘DO NOT TRACK’ MEAN? 3, 5 (Jan. 31,
2011), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-DNT-Report.pdf.
250
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against a legal mandate.253 Instead it issued guidelines and principles urging that industry create an “easy to use, persistent, and
effective Do Not Track system.”254 However, a centralized DNT
approach may be necessary in order to gain meaningful compliance.
For example, the European e-Privacy Directive in 2002 mandated
that users must be given “clear and comprehensive information”
about data tracking and a right to refuse it.255 This resulted in data
trackers allowing users to reject cookies if they could find the instructions to disable a tracking tool burrowed in a website’s privacy
policy.256
2. Regulatory Implementation
It is not clear if any federal agency currently has the authority
to implement a centralized transparency and choice portal for political data. The FTC could regulate consumer data brokers and
trackers under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.257
However, once the consumer data is sold off to a campaign or political data firm and matched with voter lists, it is not clear that the
resulting data would be regulable under the FTC’s Section 5 power

253

“[T]he FTC will focus its policy efforts … on vigorously [enforcing] existing laws,
[working] with industry on self-regulation, and [continuing] to target its education efforts
on building awareness of existing data collection and use practices and the tools to control
them.” FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at ix.
254
Id. at v.
255
Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (July 31, 2002), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML.
“Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store
information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is
provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive
95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to
refuse such processing by the data controller.” Id.
256
The European e-Privacy Directive was later amended to call for opt-in consent.
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or ‘Do Not Track:’ Advancing Transparency and
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 308
(2012).
257
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce are . . . declared unlawful.”).
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to regulate “commerce.”258 The Federal Election Commission
may also lack jurisdiction. The agency was created to enforce federal campaign finance law259 through powers specific to campaign
finance enforcement.260 When the FEC regulates in novel areas the
courts have applied heightened scrutiny to the action.261 Regardless, the FEC is notorious for gridlock and dysfunction262 and may
not be a good regulator on that basis alone.
The FTC would be the best agency to regulate computational
politics, but doing so will require jurisdictional expansion by Congress. In the past, Congress has expanded the FTC’s jurisdiction to
enforce privacy under FCRA and COPPA.263 Today, the FTC’s
small privacy division only enforces COPPA.264 Despite the narrow
jurisdictional grant, the agency has a good reputation as the de facto federal privacy agency,265 and given the dysfunctional nature of
the FEC, it would be the best candidate for the job.

258

Id. The act is only addressed to commercial practices.
“The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate
policy with respect to, this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of Title 26. The
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such
provisions.” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2012).
260
52 U.S.C. § 30107 (2014).
261
“This novel extension of the Commission’s investigative authority warrants extracareful scrutiny from the court because the activities which the FEC normally investigates
differ in terms of their constitutional significance from those which are of concern to
other federal administrative agencies whose authority relates to the regulation of
corporate, commercial, or labor activities.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Machinists NonPartisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
262
“The chairwoman of the Federal Election Commission says she’s largely given up
hope of reining in abuses in raising and spending money in the 2016 presidential campaign
and calls the agency she oversees ‘worse than dysfunctional.’” FEC Chair Ann Ravel Says
Agency is ‘Worse Than Dysfunctional’ At Regulating Money in Politics, HUFFINGTON POST
(May
2,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/03/fec-ann-raveldysfunctional_n_7197360.html; see also Jonathan Backer, Gridlock and Dysfunction on
Display at FEC Oversight Hearing, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/gridlock-and-dysfunction-display-fec-oversighthearing.
263
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602 (2014).
264
Id.
265
“Today, the FTC is viewed as the de facto federal data protection authority. A data
protection authority is common in the privacy law of most other countries, which
designate a particular agency to have the power to enforce privacy laws.” Id. at 600.
259
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B. State Voter Privacy Protections
States enjoy broad authority to regulate access to their public
records.266 In response to the growing data trade, states have implemented some restrictions to public records.267 Often states exclude access for the commercial uses of soliciting business or marketing services or products.268 Because state voter registration data
is an invaluable resource for political micro-targeters,269 states are
in a position to condition access to records on implementation of
basic privacy protections. This could be a useful interim stop-gap
to mitigate the harms caused by computational politics while Congress is in legislative dysfunction.270 Also, in the interest of national
uniformity, should Congress choose to legislate in this area, it
could easily preempt these laws in the same way that FACTA
preempted state credit data laws.271
1. State Voter Registration Databases
In response to the 2000 presidential election and Florida recount, Congress passed HAVA,272 mandating improvements to
outdated election procedures across the states. One such mandate
was the statewide computerized voter registration list, along with
uniform procedures for processing registration data.273 In the past,
voter registration lists were maintained by a patchwork of state and
local offices with little computerization, standardization, or realtime access.274 In some cases, access to voter lists required the right
266

Solove, supra note 64, at 1169.
See id.
268
Id.
269
See supra Part I.C.
270
Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein, Yes, Congress is That Bad, FOREIGN POLICY
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/.
271
“Congress chose to permanently extend the preemptions that were established
under the 1996 reforms to the FCRA and to institute additional preemptions in areas in
which the states had previously been free to regulate.” Michael Epshteyn, The Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003: Will Preemption of State Credit Reporting Laws
Harm Consumers?, 93 GEO. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2005).
272
42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012).
273
Kele Williams, Key Provisions of the Help America Vote Act, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (June 20, 2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/HAVA%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
274
See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 245.
267
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connections—or a willingness to pay.275 HAVA liberalized access
by requiring standardized databases, network computing, and realtime lists accessible by any election official in the state.276 Easily
accessible and electronic records were a significant boon for parties
and political data firms.277 Firms like Voter Vault, Catalist, and
Aristotle rely on data to make their targeting and profiling services
relevant and up to date,278 and they offer a suite of comprehensive
national voter lists comprised of state voter lists.279
2. Conditioning Access to State Voter Databases
States are in a unique position to require basic data protections
in exchange for use of voter data. Many states have already implemented prohibitions on the commercial use of voter registration
records.280 For example, “California [allows] voter registration
lists [to] be released to candidates, political committees, or for
‘election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes.”‘281 However, this likely would not place any restrictions on
political data firms accessing data.282 States could release voter lists
on the condition that campaigns and political data firms adopt
some privacy protections that will minimize harms caused by a loss
275

“While technically public information, these lists were often jealously controlled by
local party bosses. To gain access, a candidate had to have the right connections—or be
willing to pay.” Verini, supra note 55.
276
Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424,
430 (2004).
277
“As records are increasingly computerized, entire record systems rather than
individual records can be easily searched, copied, and transferred. Private sector
organizations sweep up millions of records from record systems throughout the country
and consolidate those records into gigantic record systems.” Solove, supra note 64, at
1152; see also Nick Judd, In Year of Political ‘Big Data,’ NationBuilder Makes Voter Data
Free, TECH PRESIDENT (Sept. 13, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/22856/yearpolitical-big-data-nationbuilder-makes-voter-data-free; see also Evans, supra note 10, at
883.
278
Evans, supra note 10, at 883.
279
Robert L. Mitchell, Campaign 2012: Mining for Voters, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 29,
2012), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2492578/big-data/campaign-2012—min
ing-for-voters.html?page=2.
280
See Howard, supra note 220, at 166.
281
Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan, Kent Wayland, Campaign Disclosure,
Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 965 (2011) (quoting CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2)).
282
Solove, supra note 64, at 1144 n.15
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of informational autonomy. Regulations could implement FIPs or a
centralized, state-run transparency and choice portal.283 Or, states
could require each political data tracker to adopt a DNT mechanism284 or require minimum standards for third-party sharing of voter information and the reporting of data breaches.
a) Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Voter Data
Protections
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment mandates a “right of access” to government documents.285 In general,
the right of access has only been applied to records from criminal
proceedings. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, the facts involved a Massachusetts law that protected the
privacy of juvenile victims of sexual assault by closing all criminal
trial proceedings to the public.286 The Supreme Court held that a
“major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.”287 To determine whether the
right of access applies, the Court delivered a two-prong test: (1)
examine whether the record has “historically . . . been open to the
press and general public;” (2) determine whether access “plays a
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole.”288 Lower courts today
typically apply the Globe Newspaper two-prong test.289
The Court has not squarely articulated whether the right of
access applies to other state documents and proceedings.290 However, that is no guarantee that the Globe Newspaper test does not
extended to other state records.291 Because the right of access directly implicates the right to knowledge about the government as
283

See supra Part IV.A.1.
Id.
285
Solove, supra note 64, at 1201 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980)).
286
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982).
287
Id. at 604 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
288
Solove, supra note 64, at 1201 (2002) (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605).
289
See El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S.
147, 149 (1993) (applying the Globe Newspaper test); see also United States v. Index
Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2014); Solove, supra note 64, at 1202.
290
Solove, supra note 64, at 1203.
291
Id.
284
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an essential component of discourse,292 the doctrine could easily
apply to state voter records. Therefore, in order to survive the
Globe Newspaper test, a state law that limits access to voter data will
need to be narrowly tailored to apply to particular uses293 and articulate a compelling governmental interest.294
Protecting a voter’s informational privacy could be a compelling governmental interest. The Constitution requires certain responsibilities for the way the government uses the information it
collects.295 In Whalen v. Roe, the Court extended the right to privacy296 to include personal information collected by the government.297 At issue in Whalen was whether New York State was permitted to record, in a centralized computer database, all of the
names and addresses of persons who have been prescribed certain
drugs.298 The plaintiffs argued that the collection and aggregation
of personal information on its face violated their right to privacy,299
but the Court disagreed.300 However, the Court did clearly articulate that the “zone of privacy” extends to both decisional privacy,
defined as “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,”301 and informational privacy, defined as “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”302 The Court
emphasized that accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in government computerized databases can be a clear threat
to an individual’s privacy.303 As a result, states that engage in collection and aggregation of personal information are obligated to
avoid embarrassing, harmful, and unwarranted disclosures.304 Al292

Id.
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id. at 1204–05.
297
429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
298
Id. at 591.
299
“Appellees contend that the statute invades a constitutionally protected ‘zone of
privacy.’” Id. at 598.
300
Id. at 600.
301
Id. at 599–600.
302
Id. at 599.
303
Id. at 605.
304
“The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.” Id.
293
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though a majority of the circuit courts have now accepted the constitutional right to informational privacy,305 the right has not developed much since Whalen.306
However, if a state’s voter data limitations are too burdensome,
they may potentially be struck down as a violation of the right to
vote.307 In order to determine if a state law is too burdensome on
the right to vote, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing test,
weighing “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury”
against “the precise interests put forward by the State” while considering “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff’s rights.”308 The Court has explicitly rejected
strict scrutiny;309 instead, it has accepted “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” as constitutional if the state demonstrates
an “important regulatory interest.”310
States can balance the rights of access and privacy in crafting
appropriate voter data protections. As discussed earlier, computational politics can harm a voter’s informational privacy, autonomy,
and self-determination.311 As seen in Whalen, protecting a citizen’s
informational privacy can be a valid constitutional prerogative for
states. Burdens on the right to vote aside, a state can constitutionally limit access to voter records in exchange for privacy protections.
Overall, a state voter data protection regime will have to balance
three constitutional interests: (1) the right to access information
that plays a significant role in the function of the government; (2)
305

Solove, supra note 64, at 1205 n.413.
Id.
307
The Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence has located the right to vote in the
Fourteenth Amendment. “The Supreme Court has identified various rights as
fundamental based on their importance to ensuring individual liberty and selfgovernance …. These rights include the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to
interstate travel, and, supposedly, the right to vote.” Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to
Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 147–48 (2008).
308
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
309
“Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters. Each
provision of a code, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at
least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others
for political ends.” Id. at 433.
310
Id. at 434.
311
See supra Parts II.C.1–3.
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the right of citizens to be free from harm caused by the dissemination of public records that contain their personal information; (3)
the right to be free from unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions on the right to vote.
b) Federal Statutory Limitations on State Voter Data
Protections
Limitations on voter list access will not likely run afoul of federal statutory protections. Burdens on the constitutional right to
vote aside,312 states enjoy broad power to regulate the time, place,
and manner of elections313—which includes the registration and
qualifications of voters.314 However, the federal government may
proscribe this authority with new law,315 and it has frequently done
so. Laws like the Voting Rights Act (VRA),316 HAVA,317 and the
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)318 all limit state authority
to legislate in this area.
Most relevant for our purposes are the NVRA’s requirements
that states disclose materials used to produce voter lists. In part,
the NVRA requires that states make available for public inspection
“all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.”319 Whether this provision
applies to voter lists comprised of active voters—the kind of data
sold to campaigns and political data firms320—was addressed in
True the Vote v. Hosemann321 during the 2014 midterm elections.
True the Vote involved a run-off election in the Mississippi Republican primary for U.S. Senate. A tea party challenger appeared

312
313
314
315
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317
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320
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See supra Part IV.B.2.a
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014).
52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2006).
52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–11 (2005).
52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) (2006).
See supra Part I.B.
No. 3:14-CV-532-NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014).
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poised to unseat Thad Cochran in the run-off.322 However, Senator
Cochran maintained his seat by a few thousand votes with the help
of predominantly African-American Democratic crossover votes.323
Suspicious of voter fraud, True the Vote (TTV), a Texas-based
conservative voter integrity group, sought to inspect Mississippi’s
election records,324 including active voter lists.325 Mississippi law
confines inspection of cast ballots to candidates and representatives, but makes no mention of other election materials.326 Without
clear statutory authority, Mississippi’s officials refused TTV
access in most cases.327 TTV sued Mississippi under the “public
disclosure” provision of the NVRA to gain access and lost.328 The
district court’s opinion in part found that the NVRA did not apply
to voter lists containing active voters.329 The court in Project
Vote/Voting for America v. Long noted that the NVRA’s plain meaning and statutory purpose only required disclosure of materials relevant to the carrying out of voter registration activities because
they are “the means by which an individual provides the information necessary for the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to
vote.”330 Lists of active voters are not used for maintaining accurate official lists of voters because “[w]hether a voter in ‘active’

322

Rebecca Green, Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 822–
23 (2014).
323
Nate Cohn & Derek Willis, More Evidence That Thad Cochran Owes Runoff Win to
Black Voters, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/
upshot/more-evidence-that-thad-cochran-owes-runoff-win-to-black-voters.html.
324
Emily Wagster Pettus, US Judge: Voters’ Birthdates Are Not Public Record, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/2/us-judgevoters-birthdates-are-not-public-record/.
325
Id.
326
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-271(1) (2012) (“The state executive committee of any
political party authorized to conduct political party primaries shall form an election
integrity assurance committee for each congressional district.”).
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“When TTV representatives sought access to election materials at county election
clerks’ offices, they were met with mixed results. Some counties denied TTV access
altogether.” Green, supra note 322, at 824.
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True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14-CV-532-NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 29, 2014).
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682 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,
752 F.Supp.2d 697, 707 (E.D. Va. 2010)).
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status voted or failed to vote in a particular election does not affect
that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.”331
True the Vote is instructive as to whether the NVRA will
preempt state voter data protection laws that limit access to lists of
voters. The district court’s opinion suggests that a state could limit
or even deny access to voter data, so long as the data is not relevant
to a state’s list maintenance procedures.332 Whether a state’s data
is used for list maintenance appears to be factually determined.333
So long as a state limits or gives conditional access to pure lists of
registered voters that can vote on Election Day, there will not likely
be an NVRA problem.
CONCLUSION
Computational politics has grown in lockstep with “Big Data”
practices seen in advertising and commercial industries that track
individuals online and offline with increasing efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, campaigns and the firms they hire are now in
possession of a massive trove of PII on hundreds of millions of
American voters. In the absence of regulatory oversight, these databases and the tools used to assemble them can harm a voter’s informational privacy by allowing campaigns to craft substantial informational asymmetries that make it difficult for voters to predict
331

“Voter statuses do not change as a result of the State’s processing of poll books.
Whether a voter in ‘active’ status voted or failed to vote in a particular election does not
affect that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.” True the Vote, 2014 WL 4273332,
at *17.
332
“Thus, to be subject to disclosure under the NVRA, a record must ultimately
concern activities geared towards ensuring that a State’s official list of voters is errorless
and up-to-date.” True the Vote, 2014 WL 4273332, at *14; see also Project Vote, 682 F.3d at
336 (“The requested applications are relevant to carrying out voter registration activities
because they are the means by which an individual provides the information necessary for
the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to vote.”) (internal quotations omitted).
333
See, e.g., Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 336 (“[T]he registration applications requested by
Project Vote are clearly ‘records concerning the implementation of’ this ‘program and
activit[y]’ . . . because they are ‘the means by which an individual provides the
information necessary for the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to vote’ . . .
[w]ithout verification of an applicant’s citizenship, age, and other necessary information
provided by registration applications, state officials would be unable to determine whether
that applicant meets the statutory requirements for inclusion in official voting lists.”).
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when they are being tracked, who is tracking them, and which information has been gathered. This can create serious harms to privacy and democracy in the form of discrimination, redlining, chilling effects on political association, and unaccountable black boxes.
Adopting FIPs and expanding the FTC’s jurisdiction to explicitly include political data can minimize these harms. Once given
the jurisdictional grant, the FTC can require campaigns and the
political data firms they employ to disclose their data at a one-stopshop web portal designed to disclose what data campaigns have on
voters and allow voters to initiate a DNT mechanism. States are
also free to craft voter data protection laws due to the immense
power they wield in administering and maintaining official lists of
voters. When political campaigns and political data firms purchase
these lists, the states can condition use on adoption of FIPs or a
web portal that discloses data and offers a DNT mechanism.
Whether states may freely regulate access to their voter lists will
depend on federal constitutional and statutory concerns that could
prevent the state from regulating in this area. Overall, states are
likely not to run afoul of the federal constitution or laws if their
regulations foster transparency and choice and do not implement
outright bans on particular uses of political data.

